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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
and
Andrea G. Alpern**
The Georgia Supreme Court has decided that a medical school education, a medical license, and contingent fee contracts are not marital property subject to equitable division. The court also declared that a judgment modifying alimony is effective no earlier than the date of the
judgment and that an award of joint legal custody does not preclude an
award of child support.
This Article is divided into three sections. Section I covers cases dealing with child support and visitation; Section II covers cases dealing with
settlement agreements, alimony, and equitable division; and Section III
deals with contempt.
I.

A.

CHILDREN

Child Support

In Batterson v. Groves,' the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
trial court properly considered the existence of a second child in calculating child support.2 This action began as a paternity suit filed by Batterson prior to the birth of a child out of wedlock. Following the child's birth
and a resolution of the paternity issue, the trial court held 'a hearing on
the matter of child support. The trial court determined that the father's
*
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204 Ga. App. 52, 418 S.E.2d 373 (1992).

2. Id. at 53, 418 S.E.2d at 374.
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annual income was $42,000 per year and that 25% of this amount,
$10,500, would be allocated between his two children. Rounding downward, the trial court set the child support payment to Batterson at $400
per month.3
Based upon the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 19-6-15(b)(5), 4 which states: "The amount of the obligor's child support obligation shall be determined by multiplying the obligor's gross income per pay period by a percentage based on the number of children for
whom child support is being determined," Batterson argued on appeal
that the court should have applied the guideline for one child rather than
divide in half the guideline amount for two children.5
Relying upon O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15(b)(5), 6 which directs the trial
court to make its determination of child support based upon the evidence
presented at the time of trial, and O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15(c)(6) 7 which
provides that the obligation of supporting another household may be a
factor to include in determining the level of support, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.3 In keeping with Walker v. Walker,9
the court noted: "[T]he legislature'intended that the trial courts would
consider the totality of the circumstances in setting the level of support,
and not be bound by the recommended guidelines."10
In Hunt v. Carter," the supreme court held that a judgment awarding
joint legal custody of a child pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 19-9-6' does
not preclude a monetary award of child support.13 The court reasoned
that it is "the statutory duty of both parents to support their child" and
that the term "custody" does not include payment of child support."
In Willingham v. Willingham,15 the supreme court held that the enactment of the child support guidelines did not itself constitute a substantial
change in financial circumstances within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section
19-6-19(a)." The court reversed the trial court's decision to increase the
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Supp.
15.
16.

Id. at 52-53, 418 S.E.2d at 373.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b)(5) (1991).
204 Ga. App. at 53, 418 S.E.2d at 374 (emphasis added).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b)(5).
Id. § 19-6-15(c)(6).
204 Ga. App. at 53, 418 S.E.2d at 374.
260 Ga. 442, 396 S.E.2d 235 (1990).
204 Ga. App. at 53, 418 S.E.2d at 374.
261 Ga. 259, 404 S.E.2d 121 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-6 (1991).
261 Ga. at 260, 404 S.E.2d-at 121.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2 (1991 & Supp. 1992) and O.C.G.A. § 19-9-5(a) (1991 &
1992)).
261- Ga. 674, 410 S.E.2d 98 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(a) (1991); 261 Ga. at 675, 410 S.E.2d at 98.
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child support provided for in a 1985 divorce decree solely on the enact7
ment of the guidelines.'
B.

Visitation

Kemp v. Sharp8 concerned the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act ("UCCJA").1'9 After the parties were divorced in Georgia, Sharp
moved with the parties' child to Texas. Claiming that he had .been denied
visitation, Kemp filed an action in Georgia for contempt and for modification of visitation. Sharp counterclaimed for a modification of Kemp's
child support obligation. Based upon O.C.G.A. section 19-9-23, ' 0 which
provides that custody actions be brought in the county of residence of the
legal custodian of the child, the trial court ruled that venue for the visitation modification action was in Texas. Kemp appealed.2 1
Affirming, the supreme court held that the trial court's ruling was correct, but not for the reason given. 2 The correct reason for the trial court's

declining to consider the visitation issue is that, based on the UCCJA,
"jurisdiction for modification of child custody matters, which include visitation, is in the home state of the child."22 Because Sharp and the child
lived in Texas for at least six consecutive months prior to the filing of
24
Kemp's action, Texas was the home state of the child.
Kemp argued that Sharp's counterclaim in Georgia for a modification
of child support constituted a waiver of all venue and jurisdictional defenses.25 The supreme court disagreed, stating:

[T]he UCCJA operates to withhold from the courts personal jurisdiction
over the custodial parent when the action concerns child custody and the
home state of the child is in another jurisdiction. To hold that the custodial parent, by asserting a non-custody-related claim against the noncustodial parent in the only jurisdiction appropriate for asserting that
claim, waived the benefits of the UCCJA would defeat the purposes of
the Act.2
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

261 Ga. at 675, 410 S.E.2d at 98.
261 Ga. 600, 409 S.E.2d 204 (1991).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -64 (1991).
Id. § 19-9-23.
261 Ga. at 600-01, 409 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 601, 409 S.E.2d at "205.
Id.
Id. at 601 n.2, 409 S.E.2d at 205 n.2.
Id. at 601, 409 S.E.2d at 205-06.
Id. at 601-02, 409 S.E.2d at 206 (footnote omitted).
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The court held that Sharp's counterclaim for modification did not constitute a waiver of her right to insist on litigating the custody matter in
Texas, the child's home state.2"
In Chandlerv. Chandler,5 Ms. Chandler moved her child from Georgia
without notice to Mr. Chandler, in violation of the parties' divorce decree,
and withheld visitation based on her assertion that she was protecting the
child from sexual abuse by him. In a change of custody proceeding resulting from this conduct, custody of the child was changed from Ms. Chandler to Mr. Chandler.29 In its final order, the trial court gave Ms. Chandler "no rights of visitation with the child except that she may visit with
the child at such times and places and on such conditions as are agreed to
in writing by the parties."2 0
The supreme court found that "[tihe trial court's order ha[d] the effect
of denying [Ms. Chandler] any right to visitation with her daughter
... , The court stated: "'A divorced parent has a natural right of access to [her] child awarded to the other parent, and only under exceptional circumstances should the right or privilege be denied.' ,2 The
court remanded for entry of an appropriate award to Ms. Chandler and
noted that a less extreme arrangement, including limited and supervised
visitation, could be instituted to deal with the trial court's concern that
Ms. Chandler might abduct the child again.3
II. DivoRcE
A. Settlement
In Abrams v. Abrams,3" the supreme court relied on Brumbelow v.
Northern Propane Gas Co. 5 to vacate an order enforcing a purported
oral settlement of a divorce proceeding." The court held that the purported oral settlement was unenforceable because the existence of the
agreement was disputed . Notwithstanding Uniform Superior Court Rule
4.12,3 which provides that an attorney has apparent authority to enter
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
261 Ga. 598, 409 S.E.2d 203 (1991).
Id. at 599, 409 S.E.2d at 203.
Id.
Id.

32.

Id. (quoting Shook v. Shook, 242 Ga. 55, 56, 247 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1978)).

33. Id.

34. 262 Ga. 170, 416 S.E.2d 88 (1992).
35. 251 Ga. 674, 308 S.E.2d 544 (1983).

36. 262 Ga. at 170, 416 S.E.2d at 88.
37. Id.
38. SuPEs. CT. R,4.12; see also O.C.G.A, § 15-19-5 (1990).
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into agreements on behalf of his clients and that oral agreements, if established, are enforceable, the court held that when the very existence of
an agreement is disputed, it may only be established by a writing3
In Robinson v. Robinson,'40 at the final hearing on the divorce, the parties' attorneys announced the terms of a settlement for the record. Mr.
Robinson's attorney stated that Mr. Robinson would make alimony payments until Ms. Robinson's death or remarriage. The memorialized agreement presented to the court included the additional provision that alimony would terminate if Ms. Robinson cohabitated with another male.
Over Ms. Robinson's objections, the final decree included this additional
4
provision. '

4
On appeal by Ms. Robinson, Mr. Robinson, relying on Amos v.Amos, "
argued that the trial court acted within its discretion to approve or disapprove the agreement in whole or in part or refuse to approve it as a
whole.43 The supreme court noted that the domestic relations laws of
Georgia have changed tremendously since the decision in Amos and that,
given the tremendous case loads which superior courts are experiencing, a
strong public policy of encouraging negotiations and settlement exists.4
This public policy

would be greatly eroded if we allow trial courts to add substantive terms
to agreements read and recorded in open court. Additionally, it would
create an anomaly if we allow trial courts to make substantive additions
in voluntary agreements made before the court while forbidding substantive changes in jury verdicts.2'

The court reversed the judgment of the trial court.4

B. Alimony
In Fisher v. Fredrickson,
' Fisher filed suit for a declaration that Fredrickson's remarriage terminated Fisher's duty to pay one-half of his military retirement benefits pursuant to a divorce decree which provided that
Fisher would "pay to [Fredrickson] one-half. . . of his [military] retirement benefits for her support. Said support shall begin the first month
that [Fisher] is eligible to receive retirement and continue until [Fisher]
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

262 Ga. at 170, 416 S.E.2d at 88.
261'Ga. 330, 404 S.E.2d 435 (1991).
Id. at 330-31, 404 S.E.2d at 435.
212 Ga. 670, 95 S.E.2d 51 (1956).
261 Ga. at 331, 404 S.E.2d at 436.
Id.
Id.
Id.
262 Ga. 229, 416 S.E.2d 512 (1992).
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dies." ' The trial court ruled9 that the obligation survived Fredrickson's
remarriage. Fisher appealed.'

The supreme court first considered whether the obligation in question
was periodic alimony or equitable property division.50 The court concluded that the obligation constituted periodic alimony because the number of payments was contingent upon the length of Fisher's life and,
therefore, the total amount of the payments could not be determined.5 1
Second, the court considered whether the alimony obligation terminated upon remarriage.5 2 The court stated that because the decree was
entered on June 12, 1987, the rationale of Wiley v. Wiley5 3 controlled. 4
Based on Wiley, the trial court "must construe the alimony obligation to
determine whether the parties have 'provided otherwise' under O.C.G.A.
[section] 19-6-5(b)5 to avoid termination of alimony on remarriage." s
The court acknowledged that "[tihe present standard for determining
whether a decree 'otherwise provides' for alimony not to terminate upon
remarriage is set out in Daopoulos v. Daopoulos . . . . , The Daopoulos
rule, applicable to permanent alimony obligations created after June 25,
1987, is that an instrument "provides otherwise" than the general rule
that remarriage terminates permanent alimony obligations within the
meaning of O.C.G.A. section 19-6-5(b) 5 only if it expressly refers to remarriage of the recipient and specifies that such event shall not terminate
the alimony obligation; "[tihe language must be clear and unequivocal."
C. Alimony Modification
Hendrix v. Stone" concerned a complaint for modification filed by
Stone in July 1990. Stone sought to terminate his alimony obligation on
the ground that Hendrix was engaged in a meretricious relationship. The
judgment entered upon a jury verdict terminated Stone's alimony obliga48.
49.

Id. at 229, 416 S.E.2d at 513.
Id.

50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Sapp v. Sapp, 259 Ga. 238, 240, 378 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1989)).
52. Id.
53. 243 Ga. 271, 253 S.E.2d 750 (1979).
54. 262 Ga. at 230, 416 S.E.2d at 513.
55. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b) (1991).
56. 262 Ga. at 230, 416 S.E.2d at 513. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b) provides that: "[a]ll obligations for permanent alimony, however created, the time for performance of which has not
arrived, shall terminate upon remarriage of the party to whom the obligations are owed
unless otherwise provided." O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b) (emphasis added).
57. 257 Ga. 71, 354 S.E.2d 828 (1987); 262 Ga. at 230 n.3, 416 S.E.2d at 513 n.3.
58. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b).
59. 262 Ga. at 230, 416 S.E.2d at 513.
60. 261 Ga. 874, 412 S.E.2d 536 (1992).
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tion as of May 1989.1 The supreme court reversed on the grounds that
the retroactive modification of an alimony obligation would "vitiate the
finality of the judgment obtained as to each past due installment [of alimony]. ' 62 The court held, that a judgment modifying an alimony obligation is effective no earlier than the date of the judgment." Query what
impact this decision will have on the trial courts' authority, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19(c), to order temporary modification of a permanent alimony judgment.
The parties in Howard v. Howard64 were divorced in September 1986.
The divorce decree awarded the wife $1000 per month as alimony
"continuing until the death of either party, remarriage of [wife] or otherwise terminated under the laws of Georgia, or until ten (10) years from
July 15, 1986, whichever shall come first." The decree additionally provided that at the end of the ten year period, the alimony payments would
be reduced to $800 per month "until said payments are terminated under
the laws of the State of Georgia. ' O
Ms. Howard filed an action for modification and during the trial the
jury asked whether it could "set a new time" for the alimony to be paid.
The trial court said yes. Then
the jury returned a verdict which provided that the husband would pay
wife $2,500 per month alimony beginning September 1, 1990, and "continuing until the death of either party, remarriage of wife or until September 1, 2000." Then, "if said payments have not previously terminated
by the laws of the State of Georgia, said payment of $2,500/month shall
be reduced to $2,000 per month ...until said payments are terminated
by the laws of Georgia or until the death or remarriage of [wife] or the
death of [husband]." 66
Citing Gallant v. Gallant67 and Fender v. Fender," the supreme court
held that the jury could not extend the time in which a party must make
periodic support payments because the question of modification must be
decided upon present financial circumstances and cannot reach into speculative future circumstances. 9 Query whether the jury did extend the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 874, 412 S.E.2d at 537.
Id. at 875, 412 S.E.2d at 537.
Id. (footnote omitted).
262 Ga. 144, 414 S.E.2d 203 (1992).
Id. at 144, 414 S.E.2d at 204 (quoting from the divorce decree).
Id. (quoting from the divorce decree).
223 Ga. 397, 156 S.E.2d 61 (1967).
249 Ga. 765, 294 S.E.2d 472 (1982).
262 Ga. at 145, 414 S.E.2d at 205.
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time for payment."0 The court also concluded that the jury could not
make an automatic future modification of alimony following the end of
the ten-year period.7 ' Citing Cabaniss v. Cabaniss,7' the court stated that
a fixed award of alimony may not be automatically modified "based upon
the passage of time and the possibility of a change in income during that
7' 3

time period.

In Donaldson v. Donaldson," the former husband sought to modify his
alimony obligation based on Georgia's "live-in lover statute,"' which provides, in pertinent part: "[Tihe voluntary cohabitation of [the] former
spouse with a third paity in a meretricious relationship shall also be
grounds to modify provisions made for periodic payment of permanent
alimony for the support of the former spouse." 7 "The trial court found
that at the time of the hearing on the husband's motion for modification,
the former wife was not cohabitating [sic] with a third party in a meretricious relationship." 7' The trial court held that the former wife forfeited
alimony for a four-month period during which she had Cohabited with a
third party. and further held that in the future the former wife would
forfeit a month's alimony for any thirty-day period during which she had
an unrelated male companion stay with her past midnight for more than
four nights. 78
Relying on Hendrix v.Stone,79 in which the court held that a trial
court may not retroactively modify an alimony obligation, 0 the supreme
court reversed the trial court's order regarding the four-month period
prior to the date of.the order.81 The court also reversed the trial court's
provision for prospective forfeiture of alimony on the grounds that it was
unreasonably intrusive and unauthorized based on Hathcock v. Hath70. In a well-reasoned concurring opinion Justice Bell stated:
[A) modification jury should be able to hear evidence regarding the present and
future financial circumstances of the parties, and should be able to change any

time frames set by the original jury if justified by the changed financial circumstances of the parties, so long as the overall time frame set by the original jury is

not exceeded.
262 Ga. at 146, 414 S.E.2d at 205 (Bell, J., concurring).

71. 262 Ga. at 145, 414 S.E.2d at 205.
72. 251 Ga. 177, 304 S.E.2d 65 (1983).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

262 Ga. at 145, 414 S.E.2d at 205.
262 Ga. 231, 416 S.E.2d 514 (1992).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) (1991).
262 Ga. at 231 n.1, 416 S.E.2d at 515 n.1 (brackets in original).
Id. at 232, 416 S.E.2d at 515.
Id. at 231, 416 S.E.2d at 514.
261 Ga. 874, 412 S.E.2d 536 (1992).
Id. at 874-75, 412 S.E.2d at 537.
262 Ga. at 231, 416 S.E.2d at 515.
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cock." In Hathcock, the court "construed 'meretricious' as used in OCGA
§ 19-6-19(b) to define the two situations which would justify the trial
court's modification of alimony under that section: 8 '[Ulpon proof of sexual intercourse between the former spouse and the third party . . . [or]
upon proof that the former spouse received from, gave to, or shared with
the third party expenses of their cohabitation ..
' "8
D. Equitable Division
In Lowery v. Lowery," the supreme court held that a husband's medical school education and license were not marital property subject to equitable division.86 The court stated: "These 'assets' bear no similarity to
'8 7
even the broadest view of property for purposes of equitable division.
The court added that these assets are too speculative to calculate, have
no exchange value on an open market, are personal to the husband, terminate upon his death, and cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, or
pledged." The court reversed the ruling of the trial court that the wife's
expert testimony regarding the husband's earnings must be limited to the
husband's actual present income.80 The court also held that the trial
court should have permitted the wife's expert to testify regarding the
husband's earning capacity to the extent the wife contended that it differed from his present income."
Goldstein v. Goldstein" was a divorce case in which the wife requested
discovery 'from the husband regarding the assets of his law practice along
with information concerning pending cases. The husband refused to reveal retainer agreements for pending cases, client ledgers, and settlement
offers in pending contingent fee cases, and he refused to estimate the
value of these cases. He did not argue that she was not entitled to equitable division of the law firm's assets. Rather, he argued that the value of
contingent fee cases is too peculative to be considered an asset, and that
revealing information about these cases would constitute a violation of
the attorney-client privilege.2

82. 249 Ga. 74, 287 S.E.2d 19 (1982); 262 Ga. at 232, 416 S.E.2d at 515.

83. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) (1991).
84. 262 Ga. at 231-32, 416 S.E.2d at 515 (quoting Hathcock v. Hathcock, 249 Ga. 74, 76,
287 S.E.2d 19, 22 (1982)).
85. 262 Ga. 20, 413 S.E.2d 731 (1992).
86. Id. at 21, 413 S.E.2d at 731.

87. Id.
88. Id., 413 S.E.2d at 731-32.
89. Id., 413 S.E.2d at 732.
90. Id.

91. 262 Ga. 136, 414 S.E.2d 474 (1992).
92. Id. at 136, 414 S.E.2d at 475.
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The trial judge granted the wife's motion to compel, and the supreme
court reversed." The court held that although it had decided in Courtney
v. Courtney"4 that an unvested pension plan represents contractual rights
that may be considered in making an equitable division of property, all
unvested rights are not subject to equitable division. 5 The court noted
that it is impossible to know in advance whether any specific contingent
fee case will ultimately yield a fee, or, if it does, how much the fee will be
and how much work and expense will be required to collect the fee."6 The
court decided that "[t]hese qualities of contingent fee agreements make
them too remote, speculative and uncertain to be considered marital assets in making an equitable division of property" and did not reach the
husband's other enumerations of error. 7
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hunt, joined by Justices Weltner and
Bell, agreed that contingent fee contracts are too speculative to be treated
as marital property, but stated that "it [did] not follow that these contracts should not be considered as providing relevant evidence regarding
the merits of a claim for equitable division of property, or for alimony." 9
In their view, under the broad rules governing discovery, the wife was
entitled to the discovery she -sought, as long as conditions were fashioned
to protect confidential information from being disseminated."
III. CONTEMPT

In Ward v. Ward,"' the supreme court upheld the trial court's ruling
that Mrs. Ward was in criminal contempt for failing to pay a sum that
had been discharged in bankruptcy. 1 "The parties' divorce decree required each party to make half the payments due on a bank loan.'" 2 The
trial court found Mrs. Ward to be in civil contempt for failing to make
any payments. Two months later, Mr. Ward agreed to increase his child
support payments, and the following month Mrs. Ward filed bankruptcy
and was discharged from her responsibility for the loan. 0
The trial court then granted Mr. Ward's motion to hold Mrs. Ward in
criminal contempt and to reduce his child support payments, and the su93.

Id. at 137, 414 S.E.2d at 475.

94. 256 Ga. 97, 344 S.E.2d 421 (1986).
95. 262 Ga. at 136, 414 S.E.2d at 475.
96. Id. at 137, 414 S.E.2d at 476.
97. Id.
98. Id. (Hunt, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 137-38, 414 S.E.2d at 476 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
100. 261 Ga. 659, 409 S.E.2d 518 (1991).
101. Id. at 659, 409 S.E.2d at 519.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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preme court affirmed.10 4 The court stated that although the automatic
stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 0 6 bar a finding of civil contempt to
enforce the payment of the discharged debt, the findings in this case did
authorize the trial court to hold that Mrs. Ward was guilty of criminal
contempt for wilfully disobeying its orders.10° Further, the reduction in
child support was supported by the fact that Mrs. Ward's income had
doubled since the previous child support order and that Mr. Ward had
been required to assume the entire loan obligation as a result of Mrs.
Ward's bankruptcy.107
In Franklin v. Franklin,0 8 the supreme court vacated the trial court's
finding that Hazel Franklin, as executrix of her late husband's estate, was
in contempt for failing to pay the nursing home bills incurred by Martha
Franklin, the former wife of Hazel's deceased husband.10
Martha was sixty-five years old and eligible for Medicare benefits when
she and the decedent were divorced. The decedent agreed to pay
the necessary medical expenses of [Martha] that are incurred in excess of
any Medicare claim or entitlement. [Martha] agrees to make whatever
claim is necessary for Medicare coverage and apply for any medical reimbursement expense to which she is entitled. [The decedent] agrees that
he will pay the excess medical expenses over and above the Medicare
payments. 110
Twelve years after the divorce, Martha became a nursing home resident
at a monthly cost of $1,860.1"
First, the supreme court rejected Hazel's argument that the estate was
liable only for the medical expenses for which Medicare provided partial
payment or reimbursement. 1 2 The court found the settlement provision
to be ambiguous in this regard, proceeded to construe it, and concluded
that "the decedent was responsible for any necessary medical expense incurred by Martha [except] that portion of charges for which she was entitled to receive reimbursement from Medicare." ' '
The court further held that the $90 per month charge for a private
room was not a necessary medical expense for which the estate was liable
and directed the trial court to ascertain what portion of the monthly fee
104. Id. at 659-60, 409 S.E.2d at 519.

105. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

261 Ga. at 659, 409 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 660, 409 S.E.2d at 519.
262 Ga. 218, 416 S.E.2d 503 (1992).
Id. at 220, 416 S.E.2d at 506.
Id. at 218, 416 S.E.2d at 504-05.
Id., 416 S.E.2d at 505.
Id.
Id.
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constituted a charge for necessary medical expenses.'1 4 Because of the
state of the record and the evolving body of law concerning the questions
presented, the court vacated the trial court's finding of contempt for failure to pay the nursing home bill.'
In Hartley-Selvey v. Hartley,"" the former wife brought an action for
contempt against the former husband alleging that he had failed to pay
his share of their child's college expenses in violation of the parties' settlement agreement. The agreement provided that the parties would
jointly share "any and all college expenses for the education" of the
child. ' 7 The former wife alleged that the former husband's share of the
child's college expenses was about $8,000 per year for the first two
years. 1 8
"The trial court found that [the former husband] had forgiven a $4,500
debt owed him by [the former wife], and that [he] had applied this
amount to the first .year of college, expenses.'' 9 The trial court determined that this sum was a reasonable amount for one year of college. The
trial court further found that the husband was in contempt for not paying
his share of the second year of college and ordered that the former husband might purge himself of the contempt by paying reasonable expenses
for college for the second year in the amount of $4,500.120 Reversing, the
supreme court held that the language of the settlement agreement was
clear and unambiguous and that the trial court erred in imposing a limitation on the amount which the former husband was required to contribute to the college expenses.''
IV.

CONCLUSION

m "
As Justice Smith stated in Robinson v. Robinson:
' "The domestic relations laws of this state have changed tremendously since [1956] . . . and
our superior courts are experiencing case loads that could not have been
envisioned thirty-five years ago."' 1 The Spring 1992 issue of Family Law
Quarterly contains an article entitled The Abundance of Family Law Ap-

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 219-20, 416 S.E.2d at 505.
Id. at 220, 416 S.E.2d at 506.
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peals: Too Much of a Good Thing?" 4 This article notes that since 1960,
the divorce rate in the United States has increased from 37 per 1,000
married couples to 131 per 1,000 married couples.aa
There is no need for studies to confirm that our courts are clogged and
are looking for relief. Court ordered mediation is becoming commonplace
and the opportunity to appeal domestic cases seems to be shrinking.
What is at stake as the courts look for new ways to cope? It may be the
law itself-that deliberate, organic body of knowledge that one can look
back upon to predict future outcomes. If family law becomes extra judicial, does it become nonlegal as well? The only domestic cases left to
study may be those that refine the rules for construing out of court
settlements.
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